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Interpretation of managerial activity in terms of neuroscience is typically concerned with
extreme behaviors such as corporate fraud or reckless investment (Peterson, 2007; Wargo
et al., 2010a). This paper is concerned to map out the neurophysiological and cognitive
mechanisms at work across the spectrum of managerial behaviors encountered in more
day-to-day contexts. It proposes that the competing neuro-behavioral decisions systems
(CNBDS) hypothesis (Bickel et al., 2012b) captures well the range of managerial behaviors
that can be characterized as hyper- or hypo-activity in either the limbically-based impulsive
system or the frontal-cortically based executive system with the corresponding level of
activity encountered in the alternative brain region. This pattern of neurophysiological
responding also features in the Somatic Marker Hypothesis (Damasio, 1994) and in
Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (RST; Gray and McNaughton, 2000; McNaughton and
Corr, 2004), which usefully extend the thesis, for example in the direction of personality.
In discussing these theories, the paper has three purposes: to clarify the role of cognitive
explanation in neuro-behavioral decision theory, to propose picoeconomics (Ainslie, 1992)
as the cognitive component of competing neuro-behavioral decision systems theory
and to suggest solutions to the problems of imbalanced neurophysiological activity
in managerial behavior. The first is accomplished through discussion of the role of
picoeconomics in neuro-behavioral decision theory; the second, by consideration of
adaptive-innovative cognitive styles (Kirton, 2003) in the construction of managerial teams,
a theme that can now be investigated by a dedicated research program that incorporates
psychometric analysis of personality types and cognitive styles involved in managerial
decision-making and the underlying neurophysiological bases of such decision-making.
Keywords: organizational management, decision-making, neuro-behavioral decisions systems, cognitive style,
adaption-innovation, picoeconomics
INTRODUCTION
Organizational dysfunction has numerous outcomes, from the
lack of an appropriate fit between the organization and its
environment, through the inappropriate composition of task-
based management teams, to the incompatible predispositions
and behavioral styles of individual managers. This paper is con-
cerned with the neurophysiological underpinnings of managerial
behaviors, in particular with the implications these have for the
styles of decision-making and problem-solving managers adopt
and their appropriateness for the tasks in hand. Although the neu-
rophysiological basis of behavior in organizations has attracted
considerable research attention of late (e.g., Butler and Senior,
2007a,b; Lee et al., 2007; Lee and Chamberlain, 2007), there has
been some tendency to address particular aspects of managerial
behavior such as trust, cooperation and conflict, reward process-
ing and social interaction rather than to seek a broader frame-
work of conceptualization and analysis for this central aspect
of organizational functioning. Worthy as these themes are, this
paper proposes that the competing neuro-behavioral decision
systems hypothesis (Bickel and Yi, 2008) captures the neurological
bases of forms of managerial excess that engender a pathological
tendency to avoid risk on one hand and a more reckless tendency
to discount the future consequences of current actions on the
other.
Theories of managerial behavior and, in particular,
prescriptions that derive from them, require a cognitive
understanding of the nature of decision-making. The competing
neuro-behavioral decisions systems (CNBDS), in common with
other neurophysiological accounts of behavior, tend not to have a
well-developed cognitive level of exposition. The paper, therefore,
examines picoeconomics (Ainslie, 1992), which is similarly
couched in terms of temporal discounting, as a candidate
for the cognitive component of neuro-behavioral decision
theory. Although there is a strong fit, however, picoeconomics
provides prescriptions for dealing with the excesses of managerial
behavior which befit clinical interventions but are not easily
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implementable in the context of organizational functioning. In
order to overcome this problem, two complementary areas of
cognitive-behavioral interaction are examined with a view to
increasing understanding of the cognitive component of behavior
and suggesting managerial prescriptions, especially for team-
building. These are RST (Corr, 2008a) and Adaption-Innovation
Theory of cognitive style (Kirton, 1976, 2003), both of which
rest on neurophysiological bases that overlap with those on
which neuro-behavioral decision theory rests and contribute
to the cognitive articulation of the CNBDS hypothesis and the
suggestion of meliorating action.
Section Management, Decisions and Cognition discusses the
different kinds of management decision and relates them to
their possible underlying neurophysiological bases. It also raises
the need for clarification of the cognitive dimension of existing
theories of neuro-behavioral decision systems and the necessity
for managerial application. Section Competing Decision Sys-
tems describes the CNBDS hypothesis in detail and relates it
to RST and the relevance to managerial decision-making of
managers’ temporal horizons. Section The Cognitive Dimension
introduces in detail the necessity of a cognitive component of
the CNBDS hypothesis and the philosophical implications of
speaking of cognition. It lays out criteria for a suitable cog-
nitive component including the necessity of a cognitive theory
that proceeds at the personal level of exposition, an inten-
tional account, and potential integration with the economic
bases of CNBDS theory, and a close relationship to the basic
disciplines in terms of which the theory is couched. Section
The Cognitive Dimension also proposes picoeconomics (Ainslie,
1992) as a suitable basis for the cognitive component of neuro-
behavioral decision theory and evaluates it in terms of these
criteria.
The question of appropriate prescriptions for organizational
management is raised in Section Organization-Level Strategies
for Changing Managerial Behavior. Although picoeconomics pro-
vides insight into the nature of dysfunctional decision-making,
its prescriptions are couched in clinical terms and are directed
towards the amelioration of addictive behavior. The paper turns,
therefore, to the conceptualization of managerial behavior in
terms of adaptive-innovative cognitive style (Kirton, 2003) which
has broadly similar neurophysiological foundations but which
comes equipped with clearer implications for organizational
team-building and management. The theory also has implications
which are discussed for the understanding of commonplace terms
such as strategy, innovation and structure. Overall, the integra-
tion of neuro-behavioral decision systems with picoeconomics,
RST and adaptive-innovative cognitive style suggests a theory of
managerial behavior in organizations which comprehends and
proposes means of overcoming problems of dysfunction due to
inappropriate temporal horizons (Foxall, 2010).
MANAGEMENT, DECISIONS AND COGNITION
KINDS OF MANAGEMENT DECISION
Some managerial behaviors patently fail to achieve the goals of
the organization in which they are performed, leading often to
the downfall of the managers who are responsible for them and
sometimes to the failure of the entire organization in which the
arise. The hasty shredding of documents of forensic significance,
for instance, which has recently figured in more than one dramatic
wind-up of a corporation is maladaptive not only for the stake-
holders but for the firm itself as a continuing legal entity. For
the managers employed by the organization, whether or not they
were involved in the termination with extreme prejudice of the
documents involved, the maladaptive actions of a few may mean
at the very least the interruption of careers. The apparent greed
and excessive seeking of immediate reward that accompanied
and partially caused the financial crisis of 2008 provides another
graphic illustration of the catastrophic effects of maladaptive
managerial behavior (Wargo et al., 2010a). This extreme form of
maladaptive managerial behavior illustrates vividly the immedi-
acy that motivates some actions within organizations (Peterson,
2007). The informed planning of long-term business operations,
in the absence of intrusions caused by short-term concerns, and
the timely implementation of strategic intentions, represent the
opposite extreme.
It is most probable that neither of these scenarios will figure
in the careers of most managers but temporal horizons never-
theless are the hallmark of most managerial activities. Some are
most accurately characterized as impulsive; others as planned.
This categorization does not correspond exactly to the idea of
functional decisions on the one hand, those that meet the goals of
the organization and its members, versus dysfunction decisions
on the other, those that have outcomes that are contrary to
such goals. But it seems reasonable to argue that the majority
of impulsive decisions have some dysfunctional consequences,
while the majority of planned decisions are functional in the
sense defined. It is not helpful to write off the dysfunctional
behavior as simply “irrational”: it has its own logic and we should
seek its causes just as we seek those of its antithesis. A unified
neuroscientific framework within which to pursue these ends is
required. First, however, it is necessary to define more closely the
range of decisions with which we are concerned.
Two classifications of decisions have proved remarkably
resilient and are particularly relevant to the present discussion
because they are closely related to temporal horizons: administra-
tive, operating and strategic decisions (Ansoff, 1965) and Simon’s
(1965) distinction between programmed and non-programmed
decisions. Administrative decisions tend to be routine and to
have short time frames. Strategic decisions are, by contrast, long-
term and concern the product-market scope of the enterprise,
which involves such considerations as diversification policy, the
definition of the business, the nature of customer behavior
now and in the future, and the integration of the key busi-
ness areas, namely marketing and innovation (Drucker, 2007).
Operating decisions are derived from strategic decisions that
have been taken and entail the implementation not only of
current interfaces with the business environment, such as the
management of marketing mixes, but also the implementation
and management of appropriate administrative practices. Pro-
grammed decisions are those that are sufficiently routine to
have attracted tried and tested, rule-of-thumb decisions sys-
tems; so predictable and delegable are these matters that some
authorities question whether they entail decision-making at all.
Non-programmed decisions are those that arise de novo in
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the wake of required responses to unstructured situations: new
governmental regulations, novel market requirements, radical
changes in a competitor’s behavior, and so on. These are generally
top-management responsibilities.
Although it is true that most administrative decisions are
well-programmed, most strategic decisions non-programmed,
and operating decisions a mixture of the two, there are pro-
grammed and non-programmed aspects of all three types of
decision identified by Ansoff. The key question is what level of
management is likely to be involved in each decision type. By
and large, administrative decisions can be delegated and taken
therefore by relatively junior managers. The repetitiveness that
characterizes them suggests that they entail a limited temporal
purview which recurs each time they are taken. Indeed, given
the extent to which they can be programmed, it is arguable
that they are not decisions at all. Strategic decisions are almost
by definition unprogrammable and are the domain of senior
managers responsible for the overall policy, strategic scope and
strategic direction of the enterprise. These decisions, which entail
very long-term perspectives on how the firm will develop are
almost by definition made in a context of uncertainty. They of
course have implications for the administrative and operating
decisions that flow from them. Operating decisions are typically
the province of middle managers. Although they refer to a time
period when relatively accurate assumptions can be made about
the product and factor markets in which the firm operates, they
are subject to unpredictable fluctuations, e.g., in the behavior
of competitors, which necessitate one-off tactical decisions. The
temporal horizons of such decisions may vary from the immediate
future to short market cycles.
Another way of looking at these decisions is that administrative
and to a large extent operating decisions have a pre-existing
framework of conceptualization and analysis within which they
can be resolved as they arise; in the case of genuinely strategic
decisions, it is necessary to construct such a framework cotermi-
nously with the initial decision process. It also has to be recog-
nized that once strategic decisions have been made and a suitable
decision framework established, the managerial work involved in
such decisions takes on an increasingly routine aspect. It is a myth
to think that strategic decision-making involves a root and branch
analysis of opportunities and capabilities with each planning
cycle: many strategic decisions are made recurrently with only
small changes in managerial outlook involved on each occasion.
This is of course, given the changing market, technological and
competitive environments that are the context of such decisions,
a source of danger if the firm fails to monitor its strategic space.
From the point of view of the organization, the overall object
with respect to decision-making will be to reach an acceptable
balance among administrative, operating, and strategic decision-
making so that each kind of decision is made in a timely manner
and coordinated with the taking of the other kinds of decision.
This state of affairs will ensure that conflict between short-term
and long-term organizational goals is minimized. Most analy-
ses of managerial decision-making take this purview. But the
social cognitive neuroscience approach to organizational behavior
makes it possible to discuss the tensions arising within individual
managers’ behavior patterns that makes them more or less suited
to undertake the decision tasks we have identified. This does not
of course mean anything so simplistic as that there are some
managers who are predisposed by their limbic systems to make
programmed decisions while others have a propensity to make
strategic decisions because of their advanced executive functions
(EFs). But what the explanation of managerial behavior in terms
of the CNBDS hypothesis (Bickel et al., 2012b) has in common
with work on extreme behaviors like addiction, etc., is a will-
ingness to embrace the idea that managers’ activities reflect the
degree of balance shown by their impulsive and executive systems
especially when hypoactivity of the latter permits hyperactivity of
the former. It is to this hypothesis that we now turn.
COMPETING NEURO-BEHAVIORAL DECISION SYSTEMS
The neuroscientific and especially the neuroeconomic account of
managerial behavior in organizations has often concentrated on
such matters as trust (Zak, 2004, 2007; Zak and Nadler, 2010),
cooperation and conflict (Levine, 2007; Tabibnia and Lieberman,
2007), reward processing (Wargo et al., 2010b); and social inter-
action (Caldú and Dreher, 2007). All of these have some bearing
on the kinds of functional and dysfunctional behavior with which
we are concerned.
However, this paper seeks an additional explanation for these
behaviors in the competing impulsive and executive decision
systems associated with the operations of separate, though related,
brain regions in the context of corporate problem solving. These
neural areas are also associated with differences of temporal
horizon, emotional response to circumstances and the cognitive
control of behavior. Much of the work inspired by the CNBDS
hypothesis involves addictive behavior, influenced by activity
located at the impulsive end of the neural spectrum, in contrast
to the more calculated behavior that is associated with the EFs,
located towards the other pole, which manifest in planning,
foresight and evaluation (Bickel et al., 2006, 2012b). Each neural
decision system generates its own rewards, relatively immediate
and strongly-emotional in the case of the impulsive system,
relatively long-term, considered and cognitive in the case of the
executive system (Moll and Grafman, 2011). Could it be that the
explanation of maladaptive and adaptive organizational decision-
making is to be found in the operation of these systems too?
The suspicion that CNBDS might be implicated in managers’
maladaptive behaviors is especially significant in the case of small
entrepreneurial businesses which rely largely on the endeavors
of a single prime-mover. That person’s tendency towards either
impulsiveness or self-control is likely to be a dominant influ-
ence on the effectiveness of the enterprise. A tendency towards
impulsiveness is likely to manifest in unplanned responses to
momentarily appearing opportunities which are implemented
without consideration of the long-term consequences for the firm.
Unless such instant reactions are constrained by the exercise of
EFs which engender planning, foresight, weighing of the relevant
consequences, the balance required to build and maintain a suc-
cessful organization is unlikely to be forthcoming. Conversely, an
exaggerated emphasis on strategic thinking and planning which
does not express itself in action to launch business ventures will
stymie enterprise. The possibility of imbalance arises in a different
manner in the large-scale organization. Large firms face similar
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imperatives requiring the coordination of strategic planning and
operational decision-making but the coordination is considerably
more complex since different managers are responsible for these
tasks. Complications arise because managers charged with mak-
ing administrative and operational decisions may show cognitive
and managerial styles that are incompatible with those of man-
agers charged with strategic planning.
The clearest operational measure of balance/imbalance
between the neural systems is the extent of temporal discounting
apparent in the manager’s behavior (Bickel and Yi, 2008; see also
Baumesiter and Tierney, 2011). The organization-level goal of
achieving and maintaining balance among administrative deci-
sions which are predominantly programmed in Simon’s sense,
strategic decisions which are relatively unprogrammed, and oper-
ating decisions which are predominantly programmed, but some-
times contain unprogrammed elements, has to be accomplished
through managers who are typically responsible for a single kind
of decision but who bring a particular personal time horizon
to it. While the avoidance of conflict between short-term and
long-term objectives is an organizational goal, it is not necessarily
within the competence or interests of individual managers.
THE NEED FOR CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION
The CNBDS hypothesis per se has not previously been applied to
managerial concerns. However, the distinction it makes between
the functioning of an impulsive system based on the limbic
and paralimbic systems and an executive system based on the
prefrontal cortex (PFC), together with the possibility that an
imbalance between the operations of the two systems may lead
to dysfunctional behavior, is strongly represented in the emerging
literature of the neuroeconomics of organizations (e.g., Senior
and Butler, 2007a,b; Stanton et al., 2010). What we may refer to
as neuro-behavioral decision theory, which includes the CNBDS
hypothesis, other models such as the somatic marker hypothe-
sis (Damasio, 1994), and the application of similar thinking in
management (e.g., Wargo et al., 2010a), appears to be emerging
as a research paradigm within which to understand dysfunctional
behavior (Klein and D’Esposito, 2007; Michl and Taing, 2010).
The first purpose of this paper is to examine and suggest a
solution to a conceptual problem that arises in these analyses, a
solution which may have a bearing on the kinds of problem of
dysfunctional management mentioned above. Like the CNBDS
model itself, the discussion of competing neural systems in the
context of organizational management tends to conflate events
taking place at the neurophysiological level with the cognitive
processes ascribed in order to explain and interpret behavior.
We are often assured, for instance, that this part of the brain
“evaluates”, “plans”, or “decides”. These terms all describe cog-
nitive operations that belong at a level of exposition that refers
to the person as a whole rather than the sub-personal level of
neurobiology. Each level is properly described in its own language
that obeys particular rules and which points to a separate kind of
explanation. To draw this distinction between levels of exposition
is not to make ontological distinctions or to invite a dualistic
approach: it is simply to make clear that we must speak in quite
different ways of the rate of firing of neurons from those we
employ in speaking of the way in which a consumer evaluates
alternative brands. The argument is that while ontologically we
have nothing to work with but material events, in accounting
for behavior we need to maintain the distinction between what
is happening at the sub-personal level of exposition and how we
account for behavior at the personal level.
Part of the difficulty arises from a failure to delineate a cogni-
tive component of neuro-behavioral decision theory and to show
how it is related to the sub-personal level of neurophysiological
events and the super-personal level of behavioral reinforcement.
This paper proposes that Picoeconomics (Ainslie, 1992), which
analyses the interaction of motivational states that refer to com-
peting temporal horizons, provides the necessary cognitive level
of exposition. If this incorporation of picoeconomics as a cog-
nitive level of exposition for neuro-behavioral decision theory
is successful, it suggests a means of overcoming problems of
dysfunctional managerial behavior that are due to hyperactivity
of the impulsive system aided and abetted by hypoactivity of the
executive system.
THE NEED FOR MANAGERIAL APPLICATION
The kind of extreme decision-making involved in corporate
fraud or the reckless investing that brings whole economic
systems low is comparatively rare. In any case, while neuro-
physiological processes can explain the behavior of individual
participants in such dramas, the opportunity so to act and the
far-reaching consequences of such decision-making are likely to
be determined by structural factors and special events that lie
perhaps beyond the immediate purview, and certainly beyond
the control, of the decision-makers themselves (Bailey, 2007;
Yeats and Yeats, 2007). An important focus of this paper is on
understanding better the nature of decision-making by managers
who are, by comparison, involved in more day-to-day corporate
management.
The decisions that managers are required to make vary in
terms of the cognitive level they demand, including level of
intelligence and capacity to cope with complexity. They differ
also in terms of their paradigmatic context: at the extremes,
some decisions are solvable within the framework of assumption,
behavioral norms and market structure that has prevailed hith-
erto while others require that assumption, behaviors, structures
and other variables be reconceptualized and perhaps even re-
created. We cannot take all of these factors into consideration
but we can speak in terms of the decision styles of managers
which have a bearing on their likelihood of success in tackling
the various kinds of decision with which they are confronted.
Our task is to understand better the causal fabric of the environ-
ment within which managers operate (the “super-personal level
of exposition”) and the influence of neurophysiology on their
behaviors (the “sub-personal level”).
The paper next examines the CNBDS thesis in greater depth,
relating it as appropriate to managerial behavior and concerns
(Section Competing Decision Systems). This is a prelude to
its discussing the cognitive requirements of the model and
evaluate picoeconomics as its cognitive component (Section The
Cognitive Dimension). Once that is achieved, it is possible
to consider the application of the insights of picoeconomics
and adaption—innovation theory in addressing problems of
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managerial dysfunction and the research agenda that emerge
from these approaches (Section Organization-Level Strategies for
Changing Managerial Behavior).
COMPETING DECISION SYSTEMS
OVERVIEW OF THE HYPOTHESIS
The CNBDS hypothesis rests on the somewhat simplifying
assumption that a “limbic system” can be coherently identi-
fied which is differentially implicated in emotional responding
and that a cortical area, differentially implicated in judgment,
planning and other cognitive activities, can also be identified.
Although the reality is undoubtedly more complicated than this—
neural activations are seldom exclusive to one part of the brain—
the dichotomy is retained here for ease of exposition with regard
to the CNBDS hypothesis and for the sake of continuity with a
wider literature (cf. however Lawrence and Calder (2004) with
Ross (2012)). Bickel’s hypothesis suggests that the degree of addic-
tiveness exhibited in behavior reflects the balance of activity in
these two broadly defined brain regions, the first of which, based
on the amygdala and ventral striatum, involves the distribution of
dopamine (DA) during reinforcement learning, while the second,
residing in the PFC, is implicated in the evaluation of rewards
and their outcomes (Walton et al., 2011; see also Dayan, 2012;
Symmonds and Dolan, 2012).
The impulsive system inheres in the amygdala and ventral stria-
tum, a midbrain region concerned with the valence of immediate
results of action, and is liable to become hyperactive as a result
of “exaggerated processing of the incentive value of substance-
related cues” (Bechara, 2005, p. 1459; see also Delgado and
Tricomi, 2011). Drug-induced behaviors correlate with enhanced
response in this region when the amygdala displays increased sen-
sitization to reward (London et al., 2000; Bickel and Yi, 2008). The
executive system, located in the PFC is normally associated with
planning and foresight but is hypothesized to become hypoactive
in the event of addiction; the absence of its moderating function
is responsible for the exacerbation of the effects of the hyperactive
dopaminergic reward pathway; this imbalance is then viewed as
the cause of dysfunctional behavior (Bickel et al., 2011b, 2013).
In summary, the CNBDS hypothesis posits that drug seeking
results from “amplified incentive value bestowed on drugs and
drug-related cues (via reward processing by the amygdala) and
impaired ability to inhibit behavior (due to frontal cortical dys-
function)” (Bickel and Yi, 2010, p. 2; see also Jentsch and Taylor,
1999; Rolls, 2009).
THE IMPULSIVE SYSTEM
Before considering the CNBDS hypothesis, it is useful to note
Damasio’s (1994) somatic marker hypothesis which bases a model
of decision-making systems on similar neurophysiological foun-
dations but emphasizes the role of emotion and feelings, down-
playing economic considerations. Decision-making reflects the
marker signals laid down in bioregulatory systems by conscious
and non-conscious emotion and feeling; hence, Bechara and
Damasio (2005; see also Bechara et al., 2000) argue that in
dealing with decision-making economic theory ignores emotion.
Economics is exclusively concerned with “rational Bayesian max-
imization of expected utility, as if humans were equipped with
unlimited knowledge, time, and information processing power”.
They point, by contrast, to neural evidence which shows that
“sound and rational” decision-making requires antecedent accu-
rate emotional processing (Bechara and Damasio, 2005, p. 336;
see also Phelps and Sokol-Hessner, 2012).
Damasio’s (1994) hypothesis is the outcome of brain lesion
studies in which damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC) was found to be associated with behaving in ways that
were personally harmful, especially insofar as they contributed to
injury to the social and financial status of the individual and to
their social relationships. Although many aspects of these patients’
intellectual functioning such as long-term memory were unim-
paired, they were notably disadvantaged with respect to learning
from experience and responding appropriately to emotional sit-
uations. Moreover, their general emotional level was described
as “flat”. Damasio’s observation on these findings was that “the
primary dysfunction of patients with vmPFC damage was an
inability to use emotions in decision making, particularly decision
making in the personal, financial and moral realms” (Naqvi et al.,
2006, p. 261). Thus was born the central assumption of the
somatic marker hypothesis that “emotions play a role in guiding
decisions, especially in situations in which the outcomes of one’s
choices, in terms of reward and punishment, are uncertain” (ib.;
see also Bechara, 2011). Of relevance here is the finding that
the vmPFC may be implicated in activity of the parasympathetic
nervous system (PNS), which in contrast to the sympathetic
nervous system (SNS) is involved in the explorative monitoring
of the environment and the discovery of novelty (Eisenberger and
Cole, 2012). This is corroborative of both Damasio’s view and the
nature and behavior of the innovative manager discussed below.
Inherent in the somatic marker hypothesis is the attempt to
describe not only the separate functions of the brain regions
involved in emotional processing but also the interconnections
between them (Haber, 2009). The starting point is operant
behavior, particularly the mechanisms of reinforcement learning
(Daw, 2013; Daw and Tobler, 2013). Specific behaviors even-
tuate in rewards as a result of which the amygdala triggers
emotional/bodily states. These states are then associated via a
learning process to the behaviors that brought them about by
means of mental representations. As each behavioral alternative is
subsequently deliberated upon in the course of decision-making,
the somatic state corresponding to it is re-enacted by the vmPFC.
After being brought to mind in the course of decision-making the
somatic states are represented in the brain by sensory processes in
two ways. First, emotional states are related to cortical activation
(e.g., insular cortex) in the form of conscious “gut feelings” of
desire or aversion that are mentally attributed to the behavioral
options as they are considered. Secondly, there is an unconscious
mapping of the somatic states at the subcortical level—e.g., in the
mesolimbic dopaminergic system; in this case, individuals choose
the more beneficial option without knowingly feeling the desire
for it or the aversiveness of a less beneficial alternative (Ross et al.,
2008; see also Di Chiara, 2002; Robbins and Everitt, 2002; Tobler
and Kobayashi, 2009).
The rapidity with which the impulsive system acts in pro-
pelling behavior is underlined by Rolls’s (2005) theory of emotion
in which the reinforcing stimuli consequent on a behavioral act as
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conditioned stimuli that elicit emotion feelings. The automaticity
of this interaction of operant and Pavlovian conditioning may
account for behavior in two ways. The emotion feeling may
function as an internal discriminative stimulus to increase the
probability of the behavior that produced it being reprised; it
is equally likely that the emotion feeling is the ultimate reward
of the behavior in question and that, by definition, it performs
a reinforcing role (Foxall, 2011). Either way, the effects of basic
emotions on subsequent responding is immediate and uninflu-
enced by reflection at the cognitive level. While the criticism
of economics shown by the authors of the somatic marker
hypothesis appears to rule an economic orientation out of their
purview, the CNBDS approach actively builds on insights from
operant behavioral economics (Bickel et al., 1999, 2010, 2011a,b;
Bickel and Vuchinich, 2000; Bickel and Marsch, 2001; Bickel and
Johnson, 2003).
While the somatic marker hypothesis relied in its inaugural
stages on lesion studies, the central research technique of cognitive
neuropsychology, the work of Rolls (2005) offers confirmation of
the role of operant behavior in the emerging paradigm. Recording
single neurons’ activity levels, Rolls (2005, 2008) reports that
vmPFC neurons respond to the receipt of primary reinforcers
such as pleasant-tasting foods. The integrity of the condition-
ing paradigm is evinced by the finding that devaluation of the
reinforcer, for example through satiety, reduced the responses of
such areas to these primary reinforcers. fMRI studies also offer
corroboration. Gottfried et al. (2003) report that when a predicted
primary reinforcer is devalued then vmPFC activity engendered
by that reinforcer is reduced. Hence, the vmPFC contributes to the
prediction of the reward values of alternative behaviors by refer-
ence to their capacity to generate rewarding consequences in prior
occasions. Schoenbaum et al. (2003) used lesion and physiological
studies to show that this capacity to encode predictive reward value
depends on an intact amygdala.
The CNBDS model differs in emphasis from Damasio’s
somatic marker hypothesis. Their underlying similarity inheres
in an acknowledgement that separate functions are performed
within the overall impulsive-executive system. But Bickel draws
attention to the interconnected operations of the impulsive system
and the executive system in the production of behavior (Bickel
et al., 2007). The CNBDS hypothesis is open, moreover, to the
incorporation of economic analysis in the form of behavioral
economics and neuroeconomics (Bickel et al., 2011a). Impulsive
action, defined as the choice of a smaller but sooner reward (SSR)
over a larger but later reward (LLR), is certainly associated with
the over- activation of the older limbic and paralimbic areas, while
the valuation and planning of future events and outcomes engages
the relatively new (in evolutionary terms) PFC. However, it is the
interaction of these areas, which are densely inter-meshed, that
generates overt behaviors. The CNBDS hypothesis thus stresses
the continuity of the components of the neurophysiologically-
based decision system and Bickel’s conception is therefore one of
a continuum on which the impulsive and executive systems are
arrayed theoretically as polar opponents (Porcelli and Delgado,
2009).
Specifically, Bickel et al. (2012a) identify, in addition to
trait impulsivity, four kinds of state impulsivity: behavioral
disinhibition, attentional deficit impulsivity, reflection
impulsivity and impulsive choice. Trait impulsivity is associated
with mesolimbic OFC and correlates with medial PFC,
pregenual anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and ventrolateral PFC;
venturesomeness (sensation-seeking) correlates with right lateral
orbitofrontal cortex, subgenual anterior cingualate cortex, and
left caudate nucleus activations. The concept of trait impulsivity
recognizes behavioral regularities that are cross-situationally
resilient. Within this broad construct, sensation-seeking or
venturesomeness is widely known to be related to a need to reach
an optimum stimulation level. Bickel et al. (2012a) associate
it with sensitivity to reinforcement, the theory of which has
been extensively developed by Corr (2008b) and is discussed in
greater detail below. Of the four state impulsivities discussed by
Bickel et al. (2012a), behavioral disinhibition is associated with
deficiencies in the anterior cingulate and prefrontal cortices,
attentional deficit impulsivity with impairments of caudate
nuclei, ACC, and parietal cortical structures, and with strong
activity in insular cortex; reflection impulsivity with impaired
frontal lobe function; and impulsive choice with increased
activation in limbic and paralimbic regions in the course of the
selection of immediate rewards.
This latter is again strongly predicted by RST (McNaughton
and Corr, 2008). It is debatable whether the state impulsivities
mentioned here are anything other than the behavioral man-
ifestations of trait impulsivity in particular contexts. The four
state impulsivities that Bickel et al. (2012a) note are probably
outcomes of a general tendency to act impulsively from which
they are predictable. Behavioral disinhibition is the inability to
arrest a pattern of behavior once it has started; it is also evinced in
acting prematurely with deleterious outcomes. Attentional deficit
impulsivity is failure to concentrate, to persevere with salient
stimuli. Again, the outcome is the adoption of risky behavioral
modes with poor consequences. Reflection impulsivity is failure to
gather sufficient information before deciding and acting; inability
to get an adequate measure of the situation leads to unrewarding
behaviors. Impulsive choice is a behavioral preference for a SSR
over a LLR for which the individual must wait. All of these state
impulsivities are actually behaviors, the outcomes of trait impul-
sivity. More relevant to the present discussion is preference reversal
in which a longer-term, more advantageous goal is preferred (e.g.,
verbally) at the outset only to decline dramatically in relative value
as the delivery of the earlier less advantageous reward becomes
imminent.
THE EXECUTIVE SYSTEM
Bickel et al. (2012a) define EFs as “behavior that is self-directed
toward altering future outcomes” (p. 363; see also Barkley, 2012)
and point out that EFs are consensually associated with activity
in the PFC. PFC is generally recognized as implicated in the
integration of motivational information and subsequent decision-
making (Wantanabe, 2009), exerting a supervisory function that
governs the regulation of behavior (Bickel et al., 2012a); hence,
Bickel et al. (2012a) point out, its designation as a supervisory
attentional system (SAS; Shallice and Cooper, 2011).
While some authors emphasize a single element of EFs such
as the attentional control of behavior or working memory or
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inhibition, others stress groups of elements: planning, working
memory, attentional shifting or valuing future events, emo-
tional aspects of decision-making. Addiction can then be viewed
as a breakdown in the operations of the EFs or as impaired
response inhibition leading to the increased salience of addiction-
orientated cues. Bickel et al. (2012a) concentrate on Attention,
Behavioral flexibility, Planning, Working memory, Emotional
activation and self regulation (EASR) which they group into three
major categories: (1) the cross-temporal organization of behavior
(CTOB) which is concerned with the awareness of the future con-
sequences of current or contemplated behavior and therefore with
planning for events that will occur later; (2) EASR which involves
the processing of emotion-related information and “initiating
and maintaining goal-related responding”; and (3) metacognition
which includes social cognition and insight, empathy, and theory
of mind (ToM).
The CTOB comprises attention (closely related to dorsolat-
eral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), behavioral flexibility (frontal
gyrus activity; lesioning of PFC is well-known to be associated
with the diminution of behavioral flexibility (Damasio, 1994;
Bechara, 2011), behavioral inhibition (right inferior frontal cortex
and insula are activated during behavioral inhibition which is
also associated with reduced activity in left DLPFC, the right
frontal gyrus, right medial gyrus, left cingulate, left putamen,
medial temporal, and inferior parietal cortex), planning (in which
DLPFC the VMPFC, parietal cortex, and striatum are implicated),
valuing future events (in the case of previewing and selecting
immediate rewards: limbic and paralimbic regions; in the case
of long-term decisions: prefrontal regions; see McClure et al.,
2004); and working memory (DLPFC, VMPFC, dorsal cingulate,
frontal poles, medial inferior parietal cortex, frontal gyrus, medial
frontal gyrus, and precentral gyrus; Bickel et al., 2012a, pp. 363–
367).
EASR concerned with the management of emotional responses
is implemented in Medial PFC, lateral PFC, ACC, OFC. Metacog-
nitive processes (MP) involve recognition of one’s own motivation
and that of others which is implemented in the case of insight
or self-awareness by the insula and ACC, and in the case of
social cognition by medial PFC, right superior temporal gyrus,
left temporal parietal junction, left somatosensory cortex, right
DLPFC; moreover, impaired social cognition follows lesions to
VMPFC (Damasio, 1994; Bechara, 2005; Bickel et al., 2012a, pp.
367–368).
REINFORCEMENT SENSITIVITY AND PERSONALITY
RST (Gray, 1982; Corr, 2008b; Smillie, 2008) includes the excita-
tory (impulsivity) and inhibition (executive) components of the
CNBDS model but also permits us to make extensions relating
to the expected behavior patterns that follow from each and
the way in which individual differences can be summed up
in terms of an ascription of personality types.1 RST proposes
that the basic behavioral processes of approach and avoidance
are differentially associated with reinforcement and punishment
1There are several versions of RST. The present paper makes use of the
fundamental elements of the version of the theory developed by Gray and
McNaughton (2000), McNaughton and Corr (2004) and Corr (2008a).
and that individuals show variations in their sensitivity to these
stimuli.2
Approach is behavior under the control of positively reinforc-
ing or appetitive stimuli and is mediated by neurophysiologi-
cal reward circuitry that the theory categorizes as a Behavioral
Approach System or BAS. The BAS consists in the basal ganglia,
especially in the mesolimbic dopaminergic system that projects
from the ventral tegmental area (VTA) to the ventral striatum
(notably the nucleus accumbens) and mesocortical DA PFC
(Smillie, 2008; cf. Pickering and Smillie, 2008). For recent dis-
cussion of the role of the striatum in decision-making and the
processing of rewards, see Delgado and Tricomi (2011). Recent
research demonstrating the role of this dopaminergic system in
formulating “reward prediction errors” is consonant with this
understanding. Unpredicted reward is followed by increase in
phasic dopaminergic activity whereas unpredicted non-reward is
followed by a decrease and unchanged when reward is entirely
predicted (Schultz, 2000, 2002; Schultz and Dickinson, 2000;
Schultz et al., 2008). Unpredicted reward instantiates the activity
of the BAS, therefore, and predicted reward maintains its opera-
tion. Moreover, BAS activity increases positive reward (pleasure)
and motivates approach to reinforcing stimuli and stimuli that
predict reinforcement. Such approach is characteristic of the
extraverted personality; Corr (2008b, p. 10) sums up the person-
ality type as “optimism, reward-orientation and impulsivity” and
notes that it maps clinically on to addictive behaviors.
These emotional and motivational outcomes represent one
pole of a continuum of individual differences that manifest dif-
ferential BAS and Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS) reactions to
stimuli. There is a corresponding though antithetical explanation
of avoidance in RST. Avoidance is shaped by sensitivity to stimuli
of punishment and threat and mediated by two bio-behaviorally
based systems of emotion and motivation. The first of these, the
Fight-Flight-Freeze system (FFFS), is triggered by aversive stimuli
and the resulting feeling of fear, what Corr (2008b, p. 10) refers
to as the “get me out of here emotion”; the FFFS’s motivational
output is a behavior pattern characterized as “defensive avoid-
ance”. However, if the consequential stimuli involved are mixed in
terms of their emotional valence then the BIS, which is involved
generally in the resolution of goal-conflict is activated; in this
case, the emotional output is anxiety, the “watch out for danger”
emotion Corr (2008b, p. 11) and the behavioral outputs are risk
evaluation and cautiousness which are described as manifesting
defensive approach. Hence, in summary, reward sensitivity leads
to positive emotion and approach and a response pattern that
is characterized as “extraversion” via behavioral observation or
psychometric testing; by contrast, punishment sensitivity leads to
2RST uses the term “reinforcement” to include both rewarding and punishing
stimuli. This usage can be confusing in view of the confinement of “reinforce-
ment” to instances in which consequential stimuli strengthen (i.e., increase)
the rate at which a response is emitted and “punishment” to instances in which
consequential stimuli reduce that rate, a usage common in behavior analysis in
terms of which the CNBDS hypothesis is generally formulated. I have therefore
tried to use “reinforcement” and “punishment” consistently in their behavior
analytical definitions. However, it is not always possible to do justice to RST
by adhering to this rule and on occasion I have used “reward” rather than
“reinforcement” where this is clearer.
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negative emotion and avoidance and a personality characterized
in terms of neuroticism (Smillie, 2008).
RST also relates the FFFS and BIS to specific neurophysiolog-
ical systems. In the case of the FFFS this is the periaquedital gray,
which is implicated in acute or proximal threat, and the medial
hypothalamus, amygdala and interia cingulate cortex, implicated
in distal threats. The BIS comprises the septo-hippocampal system
and the amygdala. The emotional output of the FFFS is fearfulness
while that of the BIS is anxiety. In either case, the emotional
outputs are negative and most forms of RST relate this to neuroti-
cism. The value of employing explanatory constructs referring to
personality types such as extraversion and neuroticism is that they
summaries individual differences in reinforcement sensitivity,
adding both to the interpretation of behavior and to its prediction
in novel environments.
MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR RECONSIDERED: THE INFLUENCE OF
TEMPORAL HORIZON
Dysfunctional behaviors are those dominated by either the impul-
sive system or the executive system. The impulsive system evolved
because it was evolutionarily-adaptive as far as inclusive fitness
was concerned. Its preoccupation with short-term goals and its
immediate response to opportunities ensured its contribution to
survival of the individual and thereby to its biological fitness. It
is closely related to the kinds of modular functioning posited by
Fodor (1983) which allows rapid responses to environmental con-
cerns. It is closely related also to the emotion-feelings associated
with such response capacity, pleasure in particular but also arousal
and dominance. These are the ultimate rewards of instrumentally
conditioned behavior (Rolls, 2008; Foxall, 2011).
When we speak of the dysfunctional consequences of a hyper-
active impulsive system in seeking to understand and explain a
manager’s behavioral repertoire we are referring to hyperactivity
in these emotional-reward systems which leads, for instance, to
preoccupation with short-term goals at the expense of under-
taking longer-term planning, the reckless taking of investment
decisions promising rapid high returns and a consequent over-
cautiousness, and an unwillingness to invest in future. Another
manifestation is rigidity in the pursuit of a previously selected goal
even though the environment has changed and flexibility is called
for. We are also suggesting that it is unlikely that this impulsive-
hyperactivity occurs in isolation from hypoactivity of the exec-
utive system. Hence, imbalance occurs because managers place
disproportionate importance on the emotional highs resulting
from activities that result in immediate or near-immediate rein-
forcement at the expense of the pursuit of considered action that
would be under the control of the executive system. Moreover,
both utilitarian reinforcement and informational reinforcement
are engendered which brings about high levels of pleasure and
arousal, and in a context that permits the emotion-feeling of high
dominance (Kringelbach, 2010; Foxall, 2011). This is probably
the strongest combinations of interacting reinforcement for the
maintenance of managerial behavior. From the organization’s
point of view, if this behavioral style becomes characteristic of a
function, department or even of the firm as a whole, the outcome
will be an overconcentration on administrative and operational
activities at the expense of a strategic perspective which embraces
and anticipates the opportunities and threats of the changing
market-competitive environment.
However, dysfunctional behavior may also result from hypoac-
tivity of the impulsive system and hyperactivity of the execu-
tive system (Mojzisch and Schultz-Hardt, 2007). The intellectual
rewards of a preoccupation with long-term planning, obtaining
and analyzing information, mulling over strategic possibilities,
may lead to a lack of strategic implementation so that the short-
term decisions necessary for the day-to-day operations of the
firm are neglected, working capital is lacking, the firm cannot
continue. The pleasures and arousal resulting from cognitive
activity and the feeling of dominance that this provides can
manifest in organizational sclerosis which over-values intellectual
engagement with marker structures, competition and, especially,
the strategic scope of the organization. From the organization’s
viewpoint, if this behavioral style becomes widespread, there will
be an imbalance in favor of strategic planning and decision-
making at the expense of the day-to-day imperatives of the firm’s
response to the tactical behavior of competitors and the vagaries
of consumer choice. The executive system also evolved because it
favored biological fitness. Its operation is much like that of the
central cognitive function posited by Fodor (1983).
In view of the importance of avoiding a general tendency
towards either kind of imbalance in the behavior of the firm, it
might be argued that our unit of analysis should be the organi-
zation as a whole since it is presumably structural elements in
the organization’s culture that require attention if the problem
is to be overcome. This is undeniably correct but our present
objective is less to overcome problems of imbalance, which are
anyway the subject of innumerable management texts, and more
to understand how individual managers may be prone to one or
other behavioral style. The central factor involved in diagnosing
either extreme at the individual level is the temporal horizon
of the manager since this correlates highly with the influence of
the impulsive and/or executive systems. This is best considered,
however, after the way in which cognitive language is used in
neuro-behavioral decision theory, which brings further under-
standing of the role of temporal horizon in decision-making.
It also suggests a means of overcoming problems of impulsive-
hyperactivity and executive-hypoactivity at the individual level
which must be evaluated before an organization-level solution can
be proposed and appraised.
THE COGNITIVE DIMENSION
SPEAKING OF COGNITION
Neuroscience and behavioral science employ extensional lan-
guage, the third-personal mode which is taken as the hallmark of
science (Dennett, 1969). The truth value of extensional sentences
is preserved when co-designative terms are substituted for one
another. The phrase, “the fourth from the sun” can be substituted
for “Mars” in the sentence “That planet is Mars” without surren-
dering the truth value of the sentence. However, the truth value
of a sentence containing intentional language, such as “believes”,
“desires” or “feels”, is not maintained when co-designatives are
substituted. Given the sentence, “John believes that that planet
is Mars”, we are not at liberty to say, “John believes that planet
is the fourth from the sun”, since John may not know that Mars
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is the fourth planet. Intentional sentences have another unique
property: the intensional inexistence of their subjects. The truth-
value of my saying “I am driving to Edinburgh this weekend”, an
extensionally-expressed statement, is established by there being
a place called Edinburgh to which I can travel. But if I say that
I am seeking the golden mountain, looking for the fountain of
youth or yearning for absolute truth, none of the entities named
in these intentional expressions need actually exist for the truth
value of the sentences to be upheld. Finally, it is not possible
to translate intentional sentences into extensional ones without
altering their meaning. Intentional sentences usually take the
form of an “attitude” or verb such as believes, desires or wants
followed by a proposition such as “that today is Tuesday” or
“that eggs are too expensive”; hence, such sentences are known
as “propositional attitudes” (Chisholm, 1957).
The proposed development of the CNBDS hypothesis involves
more than terminological clarification. The principles just
described govern not only linguistic usage but also the kinds of
theories we invoke in order to explain our subject matter and
care must be taken to ensure that each is confined to the level of
explanation or interpretation to which it is appropriate. Cognitive
terminology is intentional and belongs only at the level of the
person (Bennett and Hacker, 2003).
LEVELS OF EXPOSITION
Dennett (1969) distinguishes the sub-personal level of explanation,
that of “brains and neuronal functioning” from the personal level
of explanation, that of “people and minds”. The sub-personal level
thus entails a separate kind of scientific purview and approach to
explanation: by encompassing neuronal activity it is the domain
of the neuroscientist and leads to an extensional account. The
personal level which is the domain of mental phenomena is that
of the psychologist; it requires an intentional account. A third
level of explanation is required, however, in order to cover the
whole range of phenomena and sciences that deal with them
in a comprehensive approach to the explanation of behavior
(Foxall, 2004). This is the super-personal level of explanation which
encompasses operancy,3 the respect in which the rate of behavior
is contingent upon its reinforcing and punishing consequences;
this is the field of extensional behavioral science.
Care is necessary to maintain the separation of these three
levels since the mode of explanation which each entails is unique
and cannot be combined with the others in a simple fashion.
The fundamental difference in mode of explanation which must
be constantly recognized is as follows. The sub- and super-
personal levels, which are based on the neuro- and behavioral-
sciences respectively, require the use of extensional language
and explanation. Both of which are in principle amenable to
experimental (“causal”) analysis, or failing this to the quasi-
causal analysis made possible by statistical inference. They differ
from one another in terms of the kind of stimuli and responses
(independent and dependent variables) that must be taken into
3This neologism refers to the effect on behavior of environmental contingen-
cies of reinforcement and punishment. “Operancy”, which refers specifically
to the process of reinforcement and punishment of behavior, avoids the
theoretical notion of “conditioning” and is therefore more consistent with an
extensional portrayal.
consideration in empirical testing of the hypotheses to which
they give rise. They differ more fundamentally from the personal
level of explanation, which attracts a wholly different mode of
analysis, namely that of intentional psychology; the approach to
explanation in this case relies on the ascription of beliefs, desires
and feelings on the basis of non-causal criteria.
The proposed development of the CNBDS hypothesis involves
more than terminological clarification. The principles just
described govern not only linguistic usage but also the kinds of
theories we invoke in order to explain our subject matter and
care must be taken to ensure that each is confined to the level of
explanation or interpretation to which it is appropriate. Cognitive
terminology is intentional and belongs only at the level of the
person (Bennett and Hacker, 2003).
The critique of the CNBDS hypothesis takes the form therefore
of conceptual development. The CNBDS hypothesis is described
by Bickel and colleagues in neuroscientific, cognitive and behav-
ioral terms without regard to the domains of explanation to which
each of these categories belongs. For example, although they offer
what purports to be a behavioral definition of EF, they define
several of its component parts in terms that are cognitive. Follow-
ing Barkley (1997a,b), they define EF as “as behavior that is self-
directed toward altering future outcomes” (Bickel et al., 2012a,
p. 363), but they list among those of its elements which suggest
“CTOB”: attention, planning, valuing future events and working
memory. These clearly are or involve cognitive events. Similarly,
among the elements that make up “emotional and activation self-
regulation”, they list: “the processing of emotional information”
and “initiating and maintaining goal-related responding”. Finally,
as elements of “MP” they list: “social cognition” or “ToM” and
“insight”. Bickel et al. (2012a) define impulsivity behaviorally
in terms of actions prematurely performed that eventuate in
disadvantageous outcomes. They go on, however, to describe
impulsivity as consisting in the trait of impulsiveness, a structural
personality variable that incorporates sensation-seeking, deficits
in attention and reflection impulsivity which is an inability to
collect and evaluate information prior to taking a decision. All
of these are intensional.
COGNITIVE REQUIREMENTS OF NEURO-BEHAVIORAL DECISION
SYSTEMS
So far we have advocated that behavioral and neuroscientists
maintain the appropriate syntax in speaking of intentional con-
cepts such as beliefs and desires as opposed to extensional objects
such as neurons and behavior patterns. This means understanding
and maintaining the sub-personal, personal and super-personal
levels of exposition and employing only the appropriate language
at each level. A more satisfying outcome for neuro-behavioral
decision theory would be to incorporate a level of cognitive
exposition the content of which complemented the extensional
sciences we have discussed. This section sets out the criteria that
such an account should fulfill; the following section evaluates
picoeconomics (Ainslie, 1992) as that cognitive component.
There are four requirements of any candidate for the cognitive
component of neuro-behavioral decision theory. It must first be
capable of filling the need for a personal level account of the causes
of behavior. Second, it must provide an intentional explanation.
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Third, it should be capable of linking to the behavioral economics
and neuroeconomics analyses that are found in the hypothesis.
And, finally, it must relate philosophically to broader disciplinary
concerns including neurophysiology and operancy.
A personal level theory
A cognitive account is required to provide understanding of the
ways in which individuals subjectively respond to the circum-
stances which influence their behavior towards rewards that may
have short-term benefits but which entail longer-term deleterious
consequences. Being able to characterize what individuals desire
and believe in these situations, what they perceive and how
they feel, provides an indication of their underlying disposition
to respond in a particular way to rewards and punishments
occurring at different times. This is of course a highly theoretical
enterprise; in order to avoid undue speculation and conjecture,
therefore, it is important that the cognitive requirements of
neuro-behavioral decision theory are provided by a coherent body
of knowledge relating personal level factors to situations that
promote consumption.
An intentional account
The required personal level exposition must indicate the particu-
lar intentional terms that are applicable to the explanation of nor-
mal and addictive behaviors within the framework of an overall
theory that can systematically relate the two antipodal behavior
patterns. It must also be capable of explaining how intentional
entities like beliefs and desires, perceptions and emotions would
act upon the impulsion towards fulfillment of immediate wants,
such as consumption of an addictive substance, in order to bring
about a more advantageous long-term result. This calls for a well-
worked out theory of human behavior over the continuum of
normal to addictive behaviors rather than an ad hoc application
of intentional language on the basis of rapid observation of an
individual’s behavior.
An integrative economic account
The CNBDS hypothesis relies heavily on operant behavioral eco-
nomics and neuroeconomics in order to explain the reinforcer
pathologies that underlie addictive patterns of behavior. It would
be advantageous, therefore, for the cognitive component of the
model to link to the basic exposition in economic terms. The
usefulness of the cognitive account might be questioned because
of its inherently theoretical nature; this objection can be overcome
if its explanation of behavior can be specified in language that
is consonant with the provisions of consumption in the face of
extremely high elasticity of demand and temporal discounting of
the consequences of behavior.
Relationship to basic disciplines
A broader relationship between the cognitive account of behav-
ior and the underlying neuroscience and behavioral science
that comprise the CNBDS hypothesis is necessary that goes
beyond economic integration. Although a major point of the
present argument is that cognitive accounts differ fundamen-
tally from those provided by the extensional sciences, the inten-
tional component must be consistent with what is known of the
neurophysiological basis of addiction and also with its relation-
ship to the reinforcers and punishers that follow behavior.
PICOECONOMICS: PREFERENCE REVERSAL AND INTERTEMPORAL
CONFLICT
Herrnstein’s (1997) matching law suggests that the value of a
reinforcer is inversely proportional to its delay, i.e., as the delay
becomes shorter, the value increases dramatically. This is the
essence of hyperbolic discounting. The key difference between
exponential and hyperbolic discounting is that in the former the
LLR is always preferable to the SSR, regardless of time elapsed,
whereas in the latter there is a period during which the SSR
is so highly valued (because the time remaining to its possible
realization is so short) that it is preferred to the LLR (Ainslie,
1992; Ainslie and Monterosso, 2003). This is clearly not because
of its objective value which is by definition less than that which
can be obtained through patience, but because the time remaining
to its possible realization is now so short, that it is preferred
to the later but larger reward. Ainslie notes that these findings
harmonize with Freud’s observations that an infant behaves as if
expecting immediate gratification but becomes, with experience,
willing to wait for the longer-term alternative. In other words,
still paraphrasing Freud, if the pleasure principle is resisted,
the outcome will be the exercise of the reality principle. In the
terminology of behavioral psychology, the operants relevant to
each of these principles are shaped by their respective outcomes.
Ainslie argues that the two principles can be represented as two
interests, each of which seems to employ devices that undermine
the other.
In discussing what these devices are, Ainslie (1992) gives a clue
as to how we may speak of the operations of mental mechanisms
and also how they are organized to produce phenomena in a
cognitive account, i.e., one that conforms to the use of cognitive
logic as we have defined it and to the strictures of grounded
modularity as they were developed above. His first device, for
instance, is precommitment, in which for instance one joins a
slimming club in order to be able to call upon social pressures
in order to reach long term goals. The very language of this
account indicates the relevance of the models of cognition we
have developed. The processes are unobservable, adopted in order
to make behavior intelligible once the extensional accounts of
behavioral and neuro-science have been exhausted. Secondly, the
interests may hide information from one another, e.g., about the
imminence of rewards. Thirdly, the emotions that control short-
term responding may be incapable of suppression once they are in
train or they may be foreshortened by long-term interests. Finally,
current choices may be used as predictors of the whole pattern of
behavior, consisting in a sequence of multiple behaviors belonging
to the same operant class, that the individual will engage in future.
An individual may, that is, see her present choice of a chocolate
éclair as indicative that she will make this selection repeatedly
and often in the future. Individual choices are thus perceived as
precedents. The resulting strategy is what Ainslie later described
as bundling, in which the outcomes of a series of future events are
seen cumulatively as giving rise to a single value. When this value,
rather than that of a single future event, is brought into collision
with the value of the single immediate choice, the long-term
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interest is thereby strengthened (see also Baumeister and Vohs,
2003).
Subsequent behavior that serves the longer rather than the
shorter term interest is apparently rule governed rather than con-
tingency shaped (Skinner, 1969). However, the “rules” exist only
in the mind of the individual who may not have encountered the
contingencies. It is intellectually dishonest to refer to them as rules
in the sense proffered by radical behaviorists which require empir-
ical confirmation that the individual has previously encountered
similar contingencies or whose rule following behavior from
others of similar kind to the present has been reinforced. Since we
have no empirical, in particular, experimental indication of this
nature, we would more accurately refer to them as beliefs. Our use
of intentional language indicates the nature of our explanation or,
better perhaps, interpretation. Ainslie himself refers to bundling
as the basis of “personal rules” but we can have no this- personal
evidence of even the existence of such, let alone their efficacy.
Better to characterize our account as interpretation and make this
explicit by using intentional language.
In sum, Ainslie’s picoeconomics portrays the conflict between
a smaller reward that is available sooner and a larger reward
available later in terms of clashing intrapersonal interests. We can
now proceed to evaluate picoeconomics in terms of the criteria set
out above.
PICOECONOMICS AS THE REQUIRED COGNITIVE COMPONENT
A personal level account
Ainslie’s picoeconomics portrays the conflict between a smaller
reward that is available sooner and a larger reward available later
in terms of clashing intrapersonal interests. These are personal
level events because their purpose is to render intelligible the
behavior of an individual when it is no longer obvious how the
contingencies of reinforcement/punishment and his neurophysi-
ology are affecting his behavior. The behavior we are attempting
to understand is often a single instance of activity (we are taking
a molecular perspective) but the behavior which we employ to
generate and justify the intentional interpretation we have to
make is a pattern of behavior: here we are taking a molar stand-
point. There must also be a pattern of neurophysiological activity
which supports the strategic assumptions we are making about
the individual. In addition, the pattern of reinforcement (Foxall,
2013) is of crucial importance in interpreting his behavior. We are
ascribing interests and their effects in determining behavior but
we employ constructs in order to accomplish this that are unob-
servable posits: they cannot enter into an experimental analysis.
We use the molar behavior pattern, the pattern of reinforcement
and neurophysiology to underpin these strategic assumptions
and to justify our interpretation. The language of picoeconomics
consists therefore in strategic assumptions that derive from an
interpretation of the behavior and neurophysiology of the indi-
vidual. The strategic assumptions we make and the way we use
them must be consistent with the evolution of the species by
natural selection, the ontogenetic development of the individual’s
behavior through operancy, and the evolutionary psychology of
the prevalent behavior of the species. We need to show how the
behavioral sensitivity to patterns of reinforcement (which are the
subject of our studies of operancy and evolutionary psychology)
are in turn related to evolution by natural selection via synaptic
plasticity.
An intentional exposition
Picoeconomics accounts for behavior using intentional lan-
guage, specifically the cognitive language of decision-making
and problem-solving. In particular, as a theory of “the strategic
interaction of successive motivational states within the person”
(Ainslie, 1992), it is dynamically concerned with the inter-
nal weighing of information about the outcomes of alternative
courses of action and the motivational states they engender.
An economic account
Can the actions of the interests themselves be economically mod-
eled at the intentional level? Is Ainslie’s picoeconomics entirely
a cognitive theory or does it lend itself to microeconomic anal-
ysis? In fact, Ross (2012) puts forward an array of economic
models of the strategic interactions proposed by picoeconomics
among competing preferences. Analysis of behavior in terms of
the pattern of reinforcement it has previously resulted in draws
upon operant behavioral economics which is central to the CNBDS:
specifically, the analysis of discounting relates behavior to its
consequences, but operant behavioral economics also establishes
that individuals maximize utility and the particular combinations
of reinforcement that constitute utility.
Related to a broader disciplinary base
It is particularly important from the point of view of the research
program within which the current investigation is being per-
formed (see Foxall, 2007a) that the cognitive interpretation of
behavior, here picoeconomics, can be defended philosophically
in terms of the underlying behavioral and neuroscience (Foxall,
2004). This is clearly the case with picoeconomics (Foxall, 2007b).
Now that picoeconomics has been established as a cogni-
tive component for neuro-behavioral decision theory, its use-
fulness as a means of overcoming managerial dysfunction with
respect to temporal horizon can be evaluated. As Section
Organization-Level Strategies for Changing Managerial Behavior
indicates, the general thrust of picoeconomics is towards clini-
cal application that may not fit most managerial situations. In
that case, alternative approaches to management are discussed,
notably adaption-innovation theory, which are founded on sim-
ilar neurophysiological bases but which suggest more practicable
solutions.
ORGANIZATION-LEVEL STRATEGIES FOR CHANGING
MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR
STRATEGIES OF CHANGE BASED ON PICOECONOMICS
An advantage of picoeconomics in the current context is that
it suggests means of overcoming the managerial problems likely
to arise when individual managers are strongly motivated by
the goals and behavioral patterns that reflect hyperactivity in
the impulsive system and hypoactivity in the executive system.
Ainslie (1992) proposes a number of strategies through which
the individual might overcome the temporal discounting that
is the hallmark of this tendency. It is here that RST underpins
the current analysis by providing neurophysiological systems that
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underlie not only the more extreme impulsive—approach ten-
dency (BAS) the fear—engendered escape—avoidance tendency
(FFFS), but the goal-resolving tendency that seeks to reconcile the
alternative courses of action (BIS). The strategies of self-control
suggested by Ainslie can be seen as attempts to aid the BIS in its
attempts at conflict-resolution.
Ainslie (1992) proposes four personal strategies, allusion to
some of which was made above, by which the individual might
make a larger, albeit longer-term, outcome more probable: pre-
commitment, control of attention, preparation of emotion and
reward bundling. Precommitment involves using external com-
mitments to preclude the irrational choice. The individual seeks
to manipulate the external environment in order to make behav-
ior leading to the LLR more likely. Ulysses lashed himself to the
mast before temptations arose. But precommitment need not
be so dramatic. An addict may imbibe a substance that induces
nausea when alcohol is drunk. A student might arrange for
friends to take her to the library before a favorite TV program
begins. Control of attention restricts information processing with
respect to the SSR. For example, taking a route home from the
office that avoids bars or fast-food restaurants; thinking about the
car one can buy if you eliminate cigarette smoking. Preparation
of emotion may take the form of inhibiting emotions that are
customarily connected with the SSR or of increasing incompatible
emotions. Hence, graphically recalling the health risks of over-
eating, smoking or excessive alcohol consumption, thinking of the
displeasure others will show, engage cognitive reasoning in order
to eliminate the emotional anticipation that customarily lead to
consumption.
Perhaps the principal strategy, reward bundling requires the
individual to make personal rules about the perception of the
smaller-sooner and larger-later choices available. Instead of imag-
ining the present choice and its exciting outcomes (drinking
alcohol to excess) as opposed to a single somewhat amorphous
outcome of sobriety (“longer life”), reward bundling involves
bring a whole sequence of larger- later rewards to oppose rewards
of the immediately-available behavior. In the absence of such
bundling, the individual is likely to undergo repeated preference
reversals but viewing the choice as between two streams of behav-
iors and outcomes makes self-control more possible. Self-control
results from perceiving a single choice between an aggregation
of LLRs and a competing aggregation of SSRs. The sum of the
LLRs is always greater than that of the SSRs. Decision making is
then a matter of imaginatively bringing the LLRs forward in time
to the present. The personal rules necessary to ensure this self-
control take the form of private “side-bets” in which the current
choice predicts future choices. The important point in viewing
the reward sequences in this way is that the LLR is at all times
superior to the SSR even when an SSR is immediately available:
preference reversal is therefore not predictable. The rule is a side
bet that the current choice will predict future choices. If the SSR
is resisted, the bet is won: the expectation of future reward is thus
enhanced and the individual’s probability of success in resisting
temptation is increased. Selection of the SSR indicates that the
individual has lost the bet, however: the individual’s self-image
is weakened, along with his or her expectation of resisting the
temptation in the future.
The relevance of these strategies to managerial decision-
making of the kind we have been discussing is evident though
it is unclear whether a manager would be able to recognize and
change his or her behavior in the absence of detailed one-on-one
counseling. While this methodology obviously has applications
in therapeutic contexts, and Ainslie’s prescriptions fit well the
needs of substance and behavioral addicts, an application that is
more attuned to the social-structural demands of organizational
management is called for in the context with which we are here
concerned.
ADAPTION-INNOVATION THEORY
There exists an alternative approach to managerial application
of the neuropsychological work that has been reviewed in this
paper, though the following comments are indicative and call
for a dedicated research program. Adaption-innovation theory
(Kirton, 2003) suggests a means of structuring decision-making
groups that reflects competing neuro-behavioral systems and so
avoids reliance on an individual-level prescription for manage-
rial behavior. “Cognitive style” refers to a person’s persistent
preferred manner of making decisions, the characteristic way
in which they approach problems, information gathering and
processing, and the kinds of solution they are likely to work
towards and attempt to implement. As such, it is orthogonal
to cognitive level, that is intelligence or capacity. Kirton (2003)
proposes that individuals’ cognitive styles can be arrayed on
a continuum from those that predispose “doing better” (the
adaptive pole) to those that predispose “doing differently” (the
innovative pole). Adaption-innovation is measured by the Kirton
Adaption-Innovation Inventory (KAI) which evinces high levels
of reliability and validity and scores correlate with a number of
personality variables including extraversion and impulsivity. Gen-
eral population samples indicate that trait adaption-innovation
is approximately normally distributed and general population
scores, including of course those of managers, are arrayed over
a limited continuum which falls within the theoretical spectrum
of scores posited by adaption-innovation theory. In line with
the purview of this paper, therefore, the managers of whom we
speak are not extreme in their behaviors, though they some of
them may exhibit scores towards the extremes of the bipolar
construct of adaption-innovation. The behavior of the extreme
adaptor is generally characterized by a tendency towards caution
in decision-making and problem-solving, use of tried-and-tested
methods, efficiency, rule-conformity and limited quantitative cre-
ativity manifesting in the generation of relatively few, workable
solutions. The extreme innovator is, in contrast, more outlandish
in selecting decisions, more likely to propose novel solutions to
problems (many of which are impracticable), less efficient and
more likely to modify or even break the rules. Although extraver-
sion (measured, for example, by Eysenck’s E scale) emerges as
more highly correlated with adaption-innovation (measured in
the direction of the innovativeness pole), little is known about
the underlying personality profiles of adaptive and innovative
decision-makers in relation to the contingencies of reinforcement
that shape and maintain their preferred behavioral styles. RST
(Gray and McNaughton, 2000; McNaughton and Corr, 2004;
Corr, 2008a) offers a means of investigating the personality
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profiles of decision-makers and the role of reward and punish-
ment in their development and maintenance. This all suggests that
a psychometric research program concerned with the integration
of a number of fields could provide indicators for the prescription
to the problems of extreme managerial style. The program would
need to encompass the neurophysiology of cognition together
with the psychometric measurement of personality dimensions
that underlie cognitive style. Enough has been said to indicate
that we understand these fields and their interactions sufficiently
to embark on such a program. In the meantime, the following
remarks are indicative of the work that needs to be undertaken.
RECOGNIZING INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN TEAM-BUILDING
In contradistinction to innovators, adapters are typically prudent,
using tried and tested methods, cautious, apparently impervious
to boredom and unwilling to bend, let alone break, the rules.
They seek the kind of efficiency that manifests in accomplishing
known tasks more effectively. An extremely adaptive cognitive
style suggests hyperactivity of the executive system coupled with
hypoactivity of the impulsive system. Moreover, those aspects
of the executive system that involve ToM, the observation of
social conventions, meta-cognition, and some facets of behavioral
flexibility might be adaptor characteristics that would confirm
this categorization. The tentative conclusion is that adaptors
would cope well and perform advantageously when involved in
the intellectual, long-term, detailed thinking that strategic plan-
ning requires. The downside to their over-involvement in this
kind of decision-making derives from the demands that strategic
planning and commitment sometimes exert upon the ability to
undertake “outside-the-paradigm” thinking. Such demands are
likely to be, relatively, occasional but they are equally likely to arise
at times of crisis in the market and competitive environments of
firms and to benefit most from the kind of thinking which char-
acterizes a more innovative cognitive style. In contradistinction
to adaptors, innovators typically proliferate ideas that require the
relatively radical change that can modify strategic direction, the
product-market scope of the firm, and possibly diversification.
At its extreme however, this cognitive style, suggests hypoactivity
of the executive system, hyperactivity of the impulsive system.
The impulsive system is geared to the rapid identification and
evaluation of opportunities and threats, the capacity to envis-
age far-reaching, possibly disruptive, change which, in refocus-
ing the entire strategic scope of the enterprise carries with it
upheaval in working practices and both the working and non-
working lives of managers and other employees. To the extent
that these are innovator-traits, it is clear that decision groups
need to be balanced by adaptors who can supply the capacity for
sounder decision-making and the facilitators who can explain to
innovators the rationale behind the behavior of adaptors, who
are otherwise likely to be seen as too slow-moving to respond
appropriately to the crisis, and to adaptors that which underpins
the behavior of innovators who would otherwise be perceived
as too outlandish to preserve the values of the organization.
Innovators supply strengths in organizational decision-making:
they are more likely to think outside the paradigm within which
a problem has arisen, unconfined by the tried and tested methods
currently in place, and to take risks. These are all relevant when
the organization faces grave uncertainties and requires radical
strategic reorganization. But innovators may be unsuited to more
short-term decision-making which requires the skills of prudence
and caution which are the hallmark of the adapter.
Normally, strategic thinking and planning require the adven-
turous outlook of the innovator, tempered by the prudence of the
adapter. But, without top management vigilance and the planning
of the teams that participate in decision-making, it might well
attract a preponderance of extreme adapters. If this cognitive
style dominates the strategic function, there is likely to be a
dysfunctional emphasis on the planning of strategy at the expense
of the taking of strategic decisions and the implementation of
appropriate policies at the operational and administrative levels.
Insofar as strategic decisions are unprogrammed, they therefore
require the inputs of innovators. So a prolonged predominance
of adapters in this role will lead to organizational imbalance.
Normally, operational (and administrative) functions require
the efficient involvement of the adapter, tempered by the more
outward-looking tendency of the innovator. But, again without
top management vigilance, they might attract the extreme inno-
vator who seeks to take risks for short-term benefits. This will
interfere with the strategic management of the enterprise and
could jeopardize the overall operation of the firm.
LEVEL, STYLE AND STRUCTURE
“Strategic” decisions do not necessarily arise at a managerial level
that is automatically higher than that of any other kind of deci-
sion, nor do strategic decisions inherently involve the breaking
of paradigms, and innovativeness. Just because strategy involves
long-range planning does not preclude its occurring within a
paradigm, albeit of grand scope, that is nevertheless known
and generally-accepted; equally, the innovativeness of eroding
boundaries between small-scale organizational systems should
not be automatically diminished (Jablokow, 2005). Adaptive
and innovative styles of cognition and creativity are constantly
required, alongside one another, in the solving of problems.
That which predominates appropriately in any given situation
depends entirely on the specific context. Organizational problems
arise when current strategies no longer fit the demands of the
organizational environment: when markets, reflecting demand
and competition, are no longer adequately served by the norms
of organizational behavior (Jablokow and Kirton, 2009). Such
changing circumstances have two vital components. The first
is the changing environment must be perceived as involving
precipitating events, i.e., the need for change by the organization’s
leaders; it is adaptors rather than innovators who are more adept
at detecting unforeseen developments that require managerial
action. The second is the exploitation of the opportunities such
external change is prompting, or the defensive action needed to
avoid the threats that the environment contains; these tasks of
advancing the required action are more likely taken effectively
by the more innovative (Tubbs et al., 2012). This is a matter of
cognitive style, not of cognitive or decision level.
This point is summarized by the “paradox of structure”
(Kirton, 2003, pp. 126–134): while people require structure what-
ever their cognitive style, but that structure is ultimately stultify-
ing as persons, organizations and environments exhibit dynamic
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behaviors. All the more reason for founding managerial teams and
behavior patterns on the contributions of all cognitive styles.
NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL BASIS OF ADAPTION—INNOVATION
van der Molen (1994) notes on the basis of evolutionary logic
that social animals are motivated by two counterposed tendencies:
first, to find satisfaction in the company of conspecifics which
requires a degree of cooperation and conformity; secondly, to
compete with conspecifics for limited resources, such as food,
sexual partners, and territory, on which individual survival and
biological fitness rely. The personality characteristics which reflect
these motivational forces are, in turn, “strongly intercorrelated”
traits such as “self-will, thing-orientation, individualism and
innovative creativity on the one pole and compliance, person-
orientation, sociability, conformity and creative adaptiveness on
the other. Individuals differ from one another as far as the balance
between these polarities [is] concerned. This variation between
individuals must have genetic components” (van der Molen, 1994,
p. 140).
Drawing on the work of Cloninger (1986, 1987), van der
Molen (1994, pp. 150–152; see also Skinner and Fox-Francoeur,
2013) makes a strong case for the evolutionary and genetic com-
ponents of adaption—innovation. Cloninger’s “novelty-seeking”
and “reward dependence” dimensions of personality are espe-
cially pertinent. The former is driven predominantly by the
neurotransmitter DA which manifests in behavior that seeks to
alleviate boredom and monotony, to deliver the sense of exhilara-
tion and excitement that is generally termed “sensation-seeking”
(Zuckerman, 1994); these individuals demonstrate a tendency
to be “impulsive, quick-tempered and disorderly. . . quickly dis-
tracted or bored. . . easily provoked to prepare for flight or fight”
(van der Molen, 1994, p. 151). “Reward dependent” individuals
are, in contrast, highly dependent on “social reward and approval,
sentiment and succour”; they are “eager to help and please others,
persistent, industrious, warmly sympathetic, sentimental, and
sensitive to social cues, praise and personal succour, but also able
to delay gratification with the expectation of eventually being
socially rewarded” (ibid). These individuals’ behavior is strongly
controlled by the monoamine neuromodulator norepinephrine.
Which of these bundles of attributes manifests in behavior
that marks out some individuals as leaders depends entirely on
the demands of the managerial situation: retail banking, relying
for the most part on the implementation of standard operating
procedures, may have a natural tendency to encourage and reward
those behaviors that reflect an adaptive cognitive style; pharma-
ceutical companies, whose technological, demand and competi-
tive environments reflect a greater dynamism than is ordinarily
the norm for retail banking, requires for a much larger part of its
activities the presence of individuals whose cognitive and creative
styles are predominantly innovative. Investment banking which
is expected to reflect a large adaptively-creative style of operation
but which attracts innovators is in danger of becoming the kind
of “casino banking” that has been so deleterious to both corporate
and general social welfare in the last decade. But the inability
of an organization to achieve the right cognitive and creative
accommodation to its environment will predictably culminate in
catastrophe. For the retail bank whose leaders fail to perceive and
respond appropriately to the changing international competition
in high-street banking, the pharmaceutical firm that becomes
over-involved in the development and marketing of drugs that
are novel in the extreme, and for the investment bank that
over-emphasizes innovative creativity to the point where reckless
decisions are made, catastrophe is equally probable. Predominant
organizational climate, adaptive or innovative, can be disastrous
if either of these cognitive styles comes to predominate.
These behavioral styles are remarkably consonant the innova-
tive and adaptive cognitive/creative styles, respectively, described
by Kirton (2003). Their prevalence and likely genetic basis is
borne out by their consistency with the RST described above
(Corr, 2008a; see also Eysenck, 2006), though the terminology
may vary. The incorporation of adaption-innovation theory into
the framework of conceptualization and analysis also suggests a
wider search for the neurophysiological basis of styles of creativity.
But these are matters for further research.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Analyses of managerial behavior in neurophysiological terms raise
two difficulties. The first is conceptual: such accounts conflate
cognitive processes with neurophysiological events; the second
relates to practical management: such accounts offer little by way
of solution to the personal and organizational problems that result
from behavior that is motivated by excess influence of either man-
agers’ impulsive systems or their executive systems. This paper has
sought to contribute to the resolution of the conceptual prob-
lem, by introducing a cognitive dimension, picoeconomics, into
neuro-behavioral decision theory, and the adaption—innovation
theory of cognitive styles to that of the practical problem by
deriving prescriptions for changing managerial behavior.
The prime conclusion is that the use of neurophysiologi-
cal theory and research in the conceptualization of managerial
decision-making and in approaching the solution of problems
that arise therein is entirely justified but needs to be qualified
by practical considerations suggested by the nature of managerial
work and the ways in which managerial behavior can be modified
especially in the context of large-scale organizations. Prior to such
activity, however, is the resolution of conceptual problems in the
explanation of individual behavior on the basis of neurophysio-
logical events. This paper has pursued a central requirement of
neuro-behavioral decision theory’s use of intentional terminology
to explain human behavior: the role of cognitive terminology
and its implication for the shape of the overall theory. It has
argued that picoeconomics provides a valuable means of incul-
cating a cognitive level of explanation into the theory and that
one of its advantages is that it suggests solutions to hyperac-
tivity in one or other of the impulsive and executive systems
identified by the theory which is exacerbated by hypoactivity
in the alternative system. The solutions proposed by picoeco-
nomics may, however, be most suitable for remedial action in
clinical settings rather than in organizational settings. The quest
for solutions to managerial problems is more readily achieved
through organization-level models of managerial activity that
incorporate as fully as possible neurophysiological understand-
ings of behavior that are compatible with those found in neuro-
behavioral decision theory. One possibility in the present context
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is the application of adaption-innovation theory, dimensions of
which are known to map reliably on to the neurophysiological
and cognitive/personality factors that underpin impulsive and
executive systems. The proposal that managerial teams be built
and managed in ways that reflect these considerations suggests the
most relevant applications of neuro- and behavioral science, with
cognitive psychology, for the remediation of certain managerial
excesses. These conclusions lead predictably to a call for further
research along the lines indicated.
The advantage of this emphasis on cognitive style is that it
differentiates managers on the basis of their susceptibility to
hyper- or hypo-activity of either the impulsive or executive sys-
tems; and recognizing that the managerial functions with which
we are concerned are populated by managers of widely differ-
ing cognitive styles should reduce our tendencies to stereotype
managers on the basis of their broadly-defined functional roles
(Foxall and Hackett, 1994; Foxall and Minkes, 1996). The neu-
rophysiological foundations of adaption-innovation as presented
here do not map directly on to those of RST or neuro-behavioral
decision theory. But there is sufficient overlap to motivate further
investigation.
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